In 1979 French philosopher Jean-François Lyotard inaugurated the postmodern age with his publication The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge. He argued that the ‘loss of meaning in postmodernity boils down to mourning the fact that knowledge is no longer principally narrative.’[1]. Thus, technology and science had reached a point of functionality and efficiency that allowed it to abandon metanarratives of knowledge constructed within the ontologies of the humanities[2]. This vision of postmodernity posited in post-narrative knowledge of pure data and technology has only partly come to fruition. In a similar fashion to the modern age, our time has seen narratives firmly re-establish themselves into public discourse. The re-emergence of grand narratives – primarily nationalist or religious – has heralded a new philosophical paradigm, a hybridity of philosophical, political and ideological tendencies that oscillate between the modern and postmodern. This paper will argue that the recent emergence of the “Metamodern” as an open source ontology best describes the contemporary philosophical and political paradigm shift. Metamodernism’s engagement with the ‘resurgence of sincerity, hope, romanticism, affect, and the potential for grand narratives and universal truths’[3] present an opening for the re-assertion of a new metamodern politics, a hybridity of modernist political thought with postmodern scepticism. The metamodern shall be the ontology from which a new epistemology of neo-Gramscianism shall develop. The re-evaluation of Neo-Gramscian ideas of hegemony is structured around Marxist and critical theory’s emancipatory political narratives, coupled with the postmodern tools of deconstruction and discourse theory, a Neo-hegemonic theory shall be outlined for the metamodern era.
Metamodernism and Neo-Gramscianism
Before tackling metamodern politics and its relevance to neo-Gramscianism it is worth briefly outlining the philosophical contours of metamodernism. Rather then thinking of metamodernism as a closed knowledge system, cultural theorist Timotheus Vermuelen describes it as
‘Not so much a philosophy – which implies a closed ontology – as it is an attempt at a vernacular, or as you say, a sort of open source document, that might contextualise and explain what is going on around us’[4]
Thus, metamodernism lends itself to be augmented into alternative International Relations Theory acting as the environment for which the epistemology of theory can be built upon. Metamodernism’s starting point is that the ‘the postmodern years of plenty, pastiche, and parataxis are over.’[5]. That is not to say that all postmodern tendencies are obsolete but that these tendencies have formed a new meaning and direction[6]. The global formation of this new meaning and direction has been facilitated by financial crisis, geo-political instability and climatological uncertainties, on a national level by the failure of the “third way”, the polarization of localities, ethnicities and classes that ‘has required a restructuration of the political discourse.’[7]. Postmodern skepticism has lost its singular dominance and been profoundly shaken by the neo-liberal financial failures and the threat of climate catastrophe. This has infused doubt, inspired reflection, and incited ‘a move forward out of the postmodern and into the metamodern’[8].
Metamodernism oscillates between modernism and postmodernism, It swings
‘…between hope and melancholy, between naivety and knowingness, empathy and apathy, unity and plurality, totality and fragmentation, purity and ambiguity.’[9]
Such oscillation presents a unique space for critical theory to explore and act as a tool for political and social analysis. Metamodernism’s is informed by modern naivety and postmodern skepticism[10], presenting a unique opportunity to synthesise critical IRT with poststructualism.
Building upon Fredric Jameson’s 1991 assertion that the postmodern remains the authentic space for which all radical politics may develop[11], this study claims that the metamodern represents this space under the contemporary political, ideological and philosophical constellation. Thus, it is only through oscillating between the modern and postmodern that meaningful political counter-hegemony may be produced.
Metamodernism and Neo-Gramscianism
Both metamodernism and neo-Gramscianism look beyond the realm of possibility to create the impossible. That is not to say that both metamodernism and neo-Gramscianism are utopian projects, but that they seek to disrupt “the order of things” as they are by postulating a new order. For instance, ‘metamodern discourse consciously commits itself to an impossible possibility.’[12]. Similarly, critical theorists and post-Marxist’s Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe’s idea of the impossibility of society[13] mirrors the metamodernist sentiment of impossible possibility. Laclau and Mouffe argue that there will never be a totality of society as a homogenous group as class and identity are not structured through essentialism but through discourse. Moreover, singular hegemonic discourse can never be fully established as ‘it is always in conflict with other discourses that define reality differently and set out the goals for social action.’[14] Despite the impossibility of establishing a singular hegemonic discourse, they remain committed to building a counter hegemonic discourse, something they have acknowledged that in totality remains impossible. Thus, the aim is not to establish a totality of discourse but as metamodernism makes clear, through the pursuit of impossibility that new political horizons are revealed[15].
The grandfather of hegemony, Antonio Gramasci, and the father of Neo-Gramscianism, Robert Cox offer a path into the emancipatory and non-essentialist facets of hegemonic theory. Although Gramsci broke with orthodox Marxism through developing ‘a new arsenal of concepts’[16], the fluidity of Gramsci’s conception of hegemony is stifled by certain essentialist underpinnings. Most problematic is Gramsci conception of hegemony as corresponding to a fundamental economic class[17]. This is to reaffirm determination of class through a fixed and homogenous economic space producing more or less fixed and homogenous classes.[18]. Cox seeks to overcome economic determinism by emphasising not only the ideational forces of power but also the non-problem solving aspect of neo-Gramscianism. Cox asserted that
‘Theory is always for someone and for some purpose. All theories have a perspective. Perspective derive from a position in time and space, specifically social and political time and space.’ [19]
His rejection of positivist historicism presents a critical dimension that postmodernists have inherited as skepticism. Moreover, Cox’s theory retains an emancipatory aim of changing the normative structures of society, idealism that germinated from modern Marxist philosophy. This blend between skepticism, critical thinking and idealism is ripe for augmentation into a metamodern environment. Although poststructuralists – the archetype postmodern scholar – remain uneasy about any goals of emancipation[20], both neo-Gramcianists and the poststructuralists are post-positivist and believe that ‘there is no point outside the world from which the world can be observed’[21]. Neo-Gramscianists believe that ‘critical theory is historical and deals with a changing reality’[22], this is not strictly structural and allows for the development of subjectivity of actors within certain contours of material reality, ‘historical materialism was to be understood as the relationship between mentalities and material conditions of existence’[23]. This development of a post-positivist approach within Marxist thought represents the two oscillations in the metamodern landscape, modern idealism rooted in Marxist philosophy and postmodern skepticism that seeks to explain not just what happened, but why and how. However, neo-Gramscianists like Cox still rely on the contours of the material, or in Marxist terminology, a separation between the base and superstructure. Within the newly defined metamodern landscape, the requirement is to push beyond all forms of essentialism and build a grand narrative upon postmodern deconstruction theory.
Post-positivist hegemony
Building upon Derrida’s assertion that ‘there is nothing outside the text’[24], Laclau and Mouffe have synthesized discourse analysis with Gramsci’s idea of hegemony. In contrast to Gramsci’s division of the economic base to the ideological superstructure, Laclau and Mouffe have dissolved this division entirely. Within this framework there exists no objective reality or essentialist class, instead reality ‘depends on the structuring of the discursive field.’[25]. Therefore, ‘all social phenomena can be analysed using discourse analytical tools’[26]. Because there is no objective reality, searching for objective truth becomes redundant, directing discourse theory’s purpose as uncovering what Foucault called ‘regimes of truth’[27] as well as creating a new discursive hegemony.
Laclau views his conception of hegemony and Derrida’s concept of deconstruction ‘as two sides of a single operation’[28]. This merge between postmodernism/poststructural ontology and modernism/neo-Gramscianism demonstrates the malleability of neo-Gramscianism and deconstructionism as a tool for analysis and as a strategy of hegemony. Deconstruction shows that elements could combine differently, while the hegemonic intervention naturalizes a particular articulation[29]. Hegemony remains similar to discourse ‘because both terms denote a fixation of elements in moments. But the hegemonic intervention achieves this fixation across discourses that collide antagonistically.’[30]
If discourse is central to new post-positivist counter-hegemony in a metamodern landscape, then the articulation of antagonisms within the discursive battlefield is vital. Antagonism remains at the centre of Laclau and Mouffe’s political and theoretical approach. They assert that ‘there cannot be a radical politics without the definition of an adversary.’[31] Within the new establishment of hegemony, antagonism – in a discursive sense – should be reaffirmed as the authentic tool for altering social norms and epistemic underpinnings of the current order. ‘Without conflict and division, a pluralist democratic politics would be impossible.’[32] Laclau and Mouffe criticise neo-liberal political discourse for erasing social antagonisms and affirming that ‘political problems have become merely technical and democracy should be envisioned as a dialogue.[33]. Radical democracy can never be established
‘… within a neutral terrain, whose topology would not be affected’[34], but a new counter-hegemony insists on ‘…a profound transformation of the existing relations of power’[35].
But how can this post-positivist hegemony be achieved and by what means? Should it be a national or international objective? Neo-Gramscianists assert that state power rests on the underlying configuration of social forces[36]. Thus, the transformation for a counter-hegemonic bloc must re-configure the social forces underpinning states and then universalised. Neo-Gramscianists identify three main areas of hegemony as social relations of production, forms of state, and world orders. Cox’s original concept of counter-hegemony envisioned ‘the task of changing world order…with the long, laborious effort to build new historical blocs within national boundaries.’[37]. For Cox, this was necessary because of the globalized nature of society and capital. He argued that the formation of a common will depended on the transcendence of divisions of ethnicity, religion, gender and geography cutting across the three-level social hierarchy being created by globalisation.[38]. These identities that persist into our metamodern age are rooted in idealism and act as concrete axioms for people to organize their existence around. In order to transcend these identities a larger narrative of union must be evoked to form the common will and build a counter-hegemony. Changing the configuration of social forces requires an epistemological challenge to the current order. French philosopher Jacques Rancière whose concepts of the police and politics can help bridge the gap between theory and praxis to configure the social forces in the metamodern topography.
Politics and the police
Jacques Rancière’s political philosophy is rooted in radical democracy, and the struggle of the voiceless. His concept of politics and the police outline the framework in which he identifies the structure of power and democracy in contemporary society. For Rancière ‘politics is specifically opposed to the police’[39] operating as dialectical forces of opposition. Rancière’s politics is rooted in an etymological origin of the polis, meaning the people, including ‘the part of those who have no part.’[40]. Moreover, politics cannot be defined through narrow conceptions of political systems, as Rancière makes clear that identifying ‘politics with the exercise of and struggle to possess power is to do away with politics’[41] because power is based around exclusion. Therefore, ‘Politics ought to be defined on its own terms, as a mode of acting put into practice by a specific kind of subject and deriving from a particular form of reason.’[42]. For Rancière, politics starts with radical democracy and the inclusion of the excluded.
Whereas ‘political actors turn streets into stages, the police re-establish the smooth circulation of traffic.’[43]. The police are therefore understood in a metaphorical sense and not simply tools of repression or control but as ‘partitioning the sensible.’[44]. The partitioning or distribution of the sensible is an order that attempts to maintain the perceptual and conceptual consensus of “common sense” and to ‘point out the obviousness of what there is, or rather, of what there isn’t.’[45] It can be defined through the metaphor of a police officer asking onlookers to ‘Move along! There is nothing to see here!’[46].
It is worth pondering the similarities between Rancière and Laclau in order to synthesis post-positivist hegemony with the epistemic analysis of Rancière. The first is Rancière’s notion of “a class that is not a class” and Laclau’s concept of “emptiness.’[47]. This is similar to Gramsci’s idea of the subaltern, a voiceless mass that remain excluded from the proclivities of power. The second similarity is Laclau and Mouffe’s concept of hegemony with Rancière’s “part that functions as a whole”[48]. For both scholars a new hegemony or “whole” must rely on the voiceless identifying themselves with the polis as the community of the whole[49]. This is in contrast to the bureaucratised structures of the formal political parties and technocratic institutions. Gramsci observed in The Modern Prince that ‘The bureaucracy is the most dangerously habitual and conservative force; if it ends up by constituting a solid body, standing by itself and feeling independent from the masses’[50]. Gramsci makes clear the function of a political body, to move beyond its technical function and towards the embodiment of a collective political will. Laclau and Mouffe build upon this point stating that ‘politics…does not consist in simply registering already existing interests, but plays a crucial role in shaping political subjects.’[51]. With Rancière’s concept of politics and the police identified as the two antagonist forces, and Laclau and Mouffe’s post-positivist discursive strategy emphasising the centrality of discourse, how can they influence the hegemonic police order?
Dissensus and challenging hegemony
Hegemony is defined as the ‘expression of broadly based consent manifested in the acceptance of ideas and supported by material resources and institutions’.[52]. Hegemony of ideas can be defined in Rancièrian terms as the perceptual and epistemological consensus of “common sense” and the distribution of the sensible. Rancière introduces the concept of “dissensus” as a means of challenging the police order. Dissensus seeks to break the consensus by not only challenging the material social structure of hierarchy, but also deeper perceptual and epistemic underpinnings. Dissensus starts by ‘framing of a we, a subject of collective demonstration whose emergence is the element that disrupts the distribution of social parts.’[53]. It is through dissensus that the police order’s hegemonic ideational base is undermined, by the polis ‘turning streets into stages.’[54], and building a counter hegemonic epistemic and perceptual order.
Strategies for dissensus must take into consideration the metamodern landscape. Only through the discursive unity of the polis by antagonism can a counter-hegemony succeed. Discursive unity depends on a narrative, with emphasis on what Laclau and Mouffe termed floating signifiers. Floating signifiers are ‘the signs that different discourse struggles to invest with meaning…[they] belong to an ongoing struggle between different discourses to fix the meaning of important signs.’[55]. In contrast to nodal points of discourse they remain unfixed. In order to create a new counter-hegemony the floating signifiers must be contested in order to challenge the epistemology of the police order. This can be considered a strategy of dissensus.
Far from a theoretical abstract, the ideas of Laclau and Mouffe have already been discursively implemented through political dissensus. Laclau has been called the intellectual figurehead of the Syriza and Podemos political movements[56]. Íñigo Errejón, chief political strategist for Podemos, gained his PhD researching Bolivian populism; he claimed that ‘the work of Ernesto Laclau (… Chantal Mouffe) and their neo-Gramscian school of thought played a central theoretical role in my thesis.’[57]. And that Laclau’s work has ‘sown seeds enriching the intellectual and political wealth…expanded [the] horizon of the possible and showed us that politics can mean creation, tension and opening.’[58]. The leader of Podemos, Pablo Iglesias commented that the most important thing he learnt from Gramsci, Laclau and Mouffe was ‘not that activists should have a single, homogenous identity, but that they should be united as to the identity of their enemy…. “The enemy must have a face.”[59]. Podemos have created a new discursive antagonism, of la gente (the people) vs. la casta (the establishment)[60]. This antagonism, Iglesias claims, ‘has changed the political language. Now everyone speaks of la casta; everyone speaks of change.’[61].
The metamodern landscape presents an opportunity for the birth of hybrid theories. The orthodox materialism of Marxism is irrelevant to the postmodern mind, and the extreme poststructural opposition to grand theory as ‘as a social practice among other social practices’[62] cannot fulfill the hunger for meaning and change within the polis. Gramsci was proclaimed dead by postmodernists who saw the emergence of new social movements seeking radical change without wanting to influence state power. This was supposed evidence for the death of Gramsci[63]. This proclamation seems premature with the advance of Podemos in Spain and Syriza taking power in Greece, who successfully have managed to change the political discourse through antagonistic dissensus.
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[1] Lyotard, J, The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge, trans. Bennigton, G, Massumi, B, (2nd edition, Manchester 1984) p. 26.
[2] Mack, M, Philosophy and Literature in Times of Crisis, p.32.
[3] Turner, L, ‘Metamodernism: A Brief Introduction’ Notes on Metamodernism, http://www.metamodernism.com/2015/01/12/metamodernism-a-brief-introduction/ [Accessed 12/05/2016].[Accessed 12/05/2016].
[4]Potter, C, ‘Timotheus Vermeulen Talks to Cher Potter’, Tank Magazine, (2012) http://tankmagazine.com/issue-55/talk/timotheus-vermeulen
[5] Velmeulen, T van den Akker, R, ‘Notes on Metamodernism’, Journal of Aesthetics and Culture, Vol. 2. (2010) pp. 1- 14. pp. 2.
[6] Ibid. pp. 4.
[7] Ibid. pp. 5.
[8] Velmeulen, T van den Akker, R, ‘Notes on Metamodernism’, Journal of Aesthetics and Culture, pp. 5.
[9] Ibid.
[10] Ibid.
[11] James, F, Postmodern, or The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism, http://xroads.virginia.edu/~drbr/jameson/jameson.html [Accessed 12/05/2016].
[12]Velmeulen, T van den Akker, R, ‘Notes on Metamodernism’, Journal of Aesthetics and Culture, pp. 5.
[13] Laclau, E, Mouffe, C, Hegemony and Socialist strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics, (2nd edition, London 2001) p.114.
[14] Jurgensen, M, Phillips, L, Marianne, W, Discourse Analysis As Theory and Method, (London 2004) p 47.
[15] Velmeulen, T van den Akker, R, ‘Notes on Metamodernism’, Journal of Aesthetics and Culture, Vol. 2. (2010) pp. 1- 14. pp. 5.
[16] Laclau, E, Mouffe, C, Hegemony and Socialist strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics, p. ix.
[17] Ibid. p. 69
[18] Ibid.
[19] Cox, R, ‘Social Force, State and World Order: Beyond International Relations Theory’, Journals of International Studies, Vol. 10. No. 2. pp. 126 – 155.
- 128.
[20] Moolakkatu, J, ‘Robert W. Cox and Critical Theory of International Relations’, International Studies, Vol. 46. No. 4. pp. 439 – 456. pp. 440.
[21] Edkins, J, ‘Poststructualism’, International Relations Theory for the Twenty-First-Century: An Introduction, ed. Griffiths, M, (New York 2007) p.88
[22] Moolakkatu, J, ‘Robert W. Cox and Critical Theory of International Relations’, International Studies, pp. 444.
[23] Cox, R, Sinclair, T, Approaches to World Order, (Toronto 1996) p. 27.
[24] J, Derrida, Of Grammatology, trans. Spivak, G, (1997 Baltimore) p.159
[25]Laclau, E, Mouffe, C, Hegemony and Socialist strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics, p. 107-8.
[26] Jurgensen, M, Phillips, L, Discourse Analysis As Theory and Method, p.3.
[27] Foucault, M, Discipline and Punish, trans. Sheridan, A, (London 1975) p.30
[28] Laclau, E, Emancipation(s), (London 1996) p. 88.
[29] Jurgensen, M, Phillips, L, ‘Discourse Analysis As Theory and Method: Laclau and Mouffe’s Discourse Theory’, p. 48.
[30] Ibid. p. 48.
[31] Laclau, E, Mouffe, C, Hegemony and Socialist strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics, p. xvii
[32] Ibid. p. xvii
[33] Ibid. p. XV.
[34] Ibid.
[35] Ibid.
[36]Bieler, A, Morton, A, ‘Theoretical and Methodological Challenges of Neo-Gramscian Perspectives in International Political Economy’, International Gramsci Society Online Article, http://www.internationalgramscisociety.org/resources/online_articles/articles/bieler_morton.shtml [Accessed 16/05/2016].
[37] Cox, R, ‘Gramsci, Hegemony and International Relations: an Essay in Method’, Millennium journal of International Studies, Vol. 12. No. 2. (1983) pp. 162 – 175. pp. 174.
[38] Cox, R, Schenchter, M, The Political Economy of a Plural World: Critical Reflections on Power, Morals and Civilization, (London 2002) p.85.
[39]Rancière, J, ‘Ten Theses on Politics’, Theory and Event, Vol. 5, No. 3. (2001) pp. 1 – 16. pp. 8.
[40] Ibid. p. 6.
[41] Ibid. pp. 1.
[42] Ibid.
[43] Ibid.
[44] Ibid. pp. 8.
[45] Ibid. p. 8.
[46] Hallwood, P, ‘Staging Equality’, eds. Rockhill, C, Watts, P, Jacques Rancière: History, Politics, Aesthetics, (Durham 2009) p. 147.
[47] E, Laclau On Populist Reasoning, (London 2005) p. 246.
[48] Ibid, p. 224.
[49] Isin, E, Citizens without Frontiers, (London 2012) p.44.
[50] Gramsci, A, The Modern prince and other Writings (New York 1972) p. 175.
[51] Ibid. p. xvii
[52] A. Bieler & A. Morton, ‘A Critical Theory Route to Hegemony, World Order and Historical Change: Neo-Gramscian Perspectives in International Relations’, Capital & Class, Vol. 82, (2004). p. 87
[53] J, Rancière, Dissensus: On Politics and Aesthetics, trans. Corcoran, S, (London 2010) p. 141-2
[54] Hallwood, P, ‘Staging Equality’, eds. Rockhill, C, Watts, P, Jacques Rancière: History, Politics, Aesthetics, p. 147.
[55] Ibid. p.28.
[56] Hancox, D, ‘Why Enersto Laclau is the Intellectual Figurehead to Syriza and Podemos’ The Guardian, 2015, http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/feb/09/ernesto-laclau-intellectual-figurehead-syriza-podemos [Accessed 18/05/2016].
[57] Petitjean, C, Errejón, I, ‘Ernesto Laclau, Theorist of Hegemony’, Verso, http://www.versobooks.com/blogs/1578-ernesto-laclau-theorist-of-hegemony [Accessed 17/05/2016].
[58] Ibid.
[59] Williams, Z, ‘Podemos Leader Pablo Iglesias on Why He’s Like Jeremy Corbyn’, The Guardian, http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2015/dec/15/podemos-pablo-iglesias-jeremy-corbyn-spain-election-radicalism-labour [Accessed 18/05/2016].
[60]Ibid.
[61] Ibid.
[62] Edkins, J, ‘Poststructualism’, International Relations Theory for the Twenty-First-Century: An Introduction, ed. Griffiths, M, p.89
[63] Day, R, Gramsci is Dead: Anarchist Currents in the Newest Social Movements, (London 2005) p. 8.
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